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IN THE SUPREME C'01URT 
0 1F THE STATE O,F UTAH 
BARBARA LYON, 
Pla,intiff arnd Respondent, 
vs. 
HARTFORD ACCIDENT AND 
INDEMNITY COMP ANY, 
Defendarn,t and Appellant. 
and 
YOSEMITE INSURANCE CO., 
Def endM1At. 
Case No. 
12068 
REPLY BRIEF OF 
DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT 
This brief is in reply to the brief of Barbara Lyon 
and the Brief of Amicus Curiae. We will treat the points 
raised by each separately: 
POINT I 
PASSAGE OF THE UNINSURED 
MOTORIST LAW DID NOT ABROGATE 
THE RULE ESTABLISHED IN RUSSELL 
v. PAULSON. 
Russell v. Paulson, 18 Utah 2d 157, 417 P.2d 658 
(1966), involved these facts. Russell was injured while 
a passenger in a car driven by Gritton which was struck 
1 
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by a car driven by Mitchell, an ru1insured motorist. Rus-
sell obtained a $10,000 default judgment against Mitchell. 
Gritton 's insurer, United Pacific, paid $4,500 in settle-
ment. Summary judgment was entered against Russell's 
insurer, Factory Mutual, for $5,000 from which the ap-
peal was prosecuted. 
Both policies had ''other insurance'' clauses making 
the owner's (Gritton 's) coverage primary to the passen-
ger's (Russell). 
This court held that since the iimits of the Russell 
poilcy ($5,000.00) did not exceed the limits of the Grit-
ton policy ($5,000.00) the Russell policy did not apply 
and reversed the Summary Judgment. 
Because Russell v. Parulson, supra, is a controlling 
decision contrary to the position of Miss Lyon, she 
argues that the rule of that decision was abrogated by 
the passage of the 1967 Uninsured Motorist Coverage 
Requirement Act. 
That statute provides in substance that after July 
1, 1967, no automobile liability insurance policy shall be 
issued in Utah unless it provides uninsured motorist 
coverage with limits of $10,000 per injury and $20,000 
per accident unless the insured rejects such coverage in 
writing. Section 41-12-21.1, U.C.A., 1953. This statute 
is in no way inconsistent with the rule of Russell r. 
Paulson. That statute makes no reference whatever to 
''other insurance'' clauses. The legislative intent is ob-
vious. The legislature wanted to make certain that Utah 
2 
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insureds have uninsured motorist coverage with basic 
limits available to them unless they expressly reject such 
coverage. 
The legislature intended that a person involved in 
an automobile accident with an uninsured motorist be 
in no worse position than if he were involved in an ac-
cident with a person having basic limits. The legislative 
intent does not support the argument made by Miss Lyon. 
She seeks no basic limits but cumulative limits. 
It is a firmly established principle of statutory con-
struction, clearly stated in the case of Robert C. Herd 
& Co. v. Krawill Machinery Corp., 359 U.S. 297 (1959), 
that: 
"No statute is to be construed as altering the 
common law, farther than its words import. It 
is not to be construed as making any innovation 
upon the common law which it does not fairly 
express." Id. at 304. 
In Green M ownfo.in School District v. Durkee, 351 
P.2d 525 (Wash. 1960), the Supreme Court of Washing-
ton refused to accept the contention that a statute re-
la tiug to schools was a substitute for the common law 
proceeding of quo warranto, saying that it must be pre-
sumed that the legislature intended to make any inno-
vation on the common law without clearly manifesting 
such intent. 
Our research indicates that this court has never 
ruled directly on this point. However, in the case of 
In Re Utah Savin9s & Loan Assn,., 21 Utah 2d 169, 442 
3 
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P.2d 929 (1968), this court held that where there is an 
apparent conflict between two statutes, enacted for par-
ticular purposes, each should be looked at with a view 
to reconciling the conflict and giving each statute its 
intended effect. The same principle should apply where 
the alleged conflict is between a statute and a judicial 
op1mon. 
We see no conflict between the Russell case and the 
Uninsured Motorist statute. But, if conflict exists, it 
can be resolved without the necessity of one nullifying 
the Russell case. It is presumed that the legislature in 
enacting law is aware of the existing judicial decisions 
that bear on the subject. Bishop v. City of Sall'/) Jose, 
1 Cal.3d 56, 81 Cal. Rptr. 465, 460 P.2d 137 (1969). If 
the legislature had chosen to nullify the Russell case, 
it could have done so easily. 
Miss Lyon places principal reliance upon an anno-
tation fonnd at 28 A.L.R. 3d 551 entitled "Uninsured 
Motorist Insurance: Validity and Construction of 'Other 
Insurance' Provision.'' That annotation is contrary to 
Miss Lyon's position in this case. 
The annotator makes it clear that in a majority of 
jurisdictions, including Utah, ''other insurance'' pro-
visions are valid and enforceable, it being the purpose 
of legislation requiring insurers to provide uninsured 
motorist coverage to put a motorist injured in a collision 
with an nninsured vehicle in the same position that he 
would have been in had the motorist been properly in-
sured. Id. at 556. 
4 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Miss Lyon has recovered $10,000 under the uninsur-
ed motorist coverage of the owner of the vehicle in which 
she was riding. She has been placed in the position she 
would have been had the uninsured motorist had basic 
limits. The purpose of the legislation has been served. 
The rationale of Sellers v. United States Fidelity & 
Guaranty Co., 185 So.2d 869 (Fla. 1966), and Geyer v. 
Reserve Ins. Co., 8 Ariz. App. 464, 337 P.2d 556 (1968), 
relied upon by Miss Lyon is, that as a matter of public 
policy, the insurer will not be permitted to collect a pre-
mium for uninsured motorist coverage and then claim 
the benefit of ''other insurance.'' 
This rationale was rejected in Martin v. Christensen, 
22 Utah 2d 415, 454 P.2d 294 (1969), where the Utah 
Supreme Court observed that insurance premiums are 
ealculated on the basis of the coverage provided, includ-
ing other insurance clauses. 
Southeast Furniture Co. and The State Insura;nce 
Fund v. Dean L. Barrett and The Industrial Comm. of 
Utah, 24 Utah 2d 24, 465 P.2d 346 (1970), cited by Miss 
Lyon, does not support her position in this case. That 
case holds only that uninsured motorist benfits cannot 
be used to reduce amounts due under the· Workmen's 
Compensation Act. The decision is based squarely upon 
an interpretation of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 
not upon an overriding public policy. 
In Martin v. Christensen, 22 Utah 2d 415, 454 P.2d 
294 (1969), it was held expressly that Section 41-12-21.1, 
5 
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U.C.A., 1953, did not prevent an insurer from issuing a 
policy limiting its coverage to the statutory requirement. 
This decision expressly rejected the argument that 
by accepting a premium, the limitation was waived. The 
court said: 
''In contending that despite the provisions of 
paragraph 7 they should have the maximum 
coverage under both policies, the plaintiffs urge 
two points : that by issuing a second policy and 
accepting a premium therefor, the defendant 
should be deemed to have waived the limiting pro-
vision of said Paragraph 7; and that Sec. 41-12-
21.1, U.C.A., 1953 (1967 Supp.), which provides 
that automobile insurance policies shall have 
limits of not less than $10,000 for death or injury 
to one person in one accident and not less than 
$20,000 for two or more persons, should apply to 
each policy separately. Plaintiffs argue that this 
statute fixes the minimum coverage under each 
policy separately, and that they are therefore en-
titled to the maximum amount under both policies. 
"We are unable to see merit in the plaintiffs' 
arguments. We consider them in reverse order. 
The statute referred to simply provides that such 
a policy shall give a coverage of not less than 
$10,000 for injury or death to one person in one 
accident, or $20,000 for two or more. The policies 
owned by the Martins conformed to that require-
ment. The important fact would seem to be that, 
under one policy or two, the insured was protect-
ed against uninsured motorists to the extent the 
statute prescribes. So long as that coverage is 
provided, there is nothing in the statute which 
would prevent an insurer, in issuing a second 
policy, from limiting its coverage to the statutory 
requirement. It is the Company's position that 
6 
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said Paragraph 7 under scrutiny here was ex-
pressly designed to provide that coverage under 
one policy and to avoid the effect of cumulative 
or multiple limits on a single accident where an 
insured has more than one policy; and further, 
that its premiums are based on the total exposure 
of risk on the entire policy as written, including 
the limitations in paragraph 7. This impresses us 
as reasonable and as providing the answer to 
plaintiffs' other contention that by acceptance 
of the premium on the second policy the defend-
ant should be deemed to have waived the limita-
tion in question. 
''On the basis of what we have said above it 
is our conclusion that the trial court was correct 
in its ruling that the defendant Company was 
liable only for the one maximum coverage of 
$20,000 as provided for in the policies. 
''Affirmed. Costs to defendants (respond-
ents)." Id. at 295. 
POINT II 
IF HARTFORD HAS LIABILITY UN-
DER ITS UNINSURED MOTORISTS COV-
ERAGE, IT IS ENTITLED TO SET OFF 
THE $2,000 PAID UNDER THE MEDICAL 
PAYMENTS COVERAGE WITHOUT AL-
LOWANCE OF ATTORNEYS' FEES. 
The thrust of Miss Lyon's argument under this 
point is that Hartford is trying to collect a full premium 
for uninsured motorist coverage and provide less than 
statutory minimum by seeking recoupment of amounts 
paid under the medical payments coverage. 
7 
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The inherent fallacy becomes obvious upon a state-
ment of the proposition. 
Hartford is not seeking to pay less than the statu-
tory minimum. It is trying to avoid paying more, the 
precise question involved in Martin v. Christensen, 
supra. 
Here agam, to avoid a controlling decision of this 
court, namely, State Farm Mut. Ins. Co. v. Fa,rmers Ins. 
Exch., 22Utah2d183, 450 P.2d 458 (1969), Miss Ly>on ap-
peals to public policy saying that the insured is entitled 
to recover the same amount she would have recovered 
had the offending motorist maintained liability insur-
ance. 
This is precisely what we are saying. If Nickel had 
had $10,000 liability insurance, Hartford would have 
been entitled to recover its $2,000 medical payments back 
and Miss Lyon would not have had recourse to her un-
insured motorist coverage because she would not have 
been injured in an accident with an uninsured motorist. 
Miss Lyon's attorney says that it is unconscionable 
that Hartford should be permitted to sit idly by and ac-
cept the benefits of his work in making the recovery 
against Butcher's insurer. This is another one of those 
situations in which what seems unconscionable depends 
upon one's point of view. 
It seems unconscionable to the insurance industry 
that lawyers can sue them and recover attorneys' fees 
8 
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based upon the allowance of off sets to which they were 
entitled as a matter of law. A similar ploy was involved 
in Draper v. Travelers Insurance Co., 429 F.2d 44 (1970). 
In that case attorneys' fees were sought against Travel-
ers on the theory it benefited from the settlement action. 
District Judge Ritter had granted summary judgment 
for the plaintiffs. On appeal, the Tenth Circuit reversed 
with directions to enter judgment for the defendant, al-
though on more limited grounds than here asserted. 
Mr. McRae has never admitted that Hartford was 
entitled to reimbursement of the $2,000 of medical pay-
ments. His position has at all times been adverse to that 
of Hartford. 
How can he make claim that he was representing the 
interests of Hartford in seeking recovery of that sum 1 
POINT III 
INTEREST RUNS FROM THE DATE 
OF THE JUDGMENT AGAINST THE UNIN-
SURED MOTORIST. 
Until Miss Lyon's claim against the uninsured 
motorist was established, she could not have recovered 
interest against him. Nichols v. Union Pac. Ry. Co. 
7 Utah 510, 27 P. 693 (1891). 
The policy provides : 
''The company will pay all sums which the 
insured shall be legally entitled to recover as 
damages from the owner or operator of an unin-
sured motor vehicle .... '' 
9 
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If Miss Lyon could not have recovered interest 
against the uninsured motorist, it seems self-evident that 
she cannot recover interest against The Hartford under 
her policy. 
POINT IV 
HARTFORD WAS NOT UNDER A DUTY 
TO SETTLE THE UNINSURED MOTORIST 
CLAIM OF MISS LYON AGAINST IT. 
Miss Lyon urges that Hartford is liable to her for 
refusal to settle. She bases this claim upon cases where 
liability companies have been liable for refusing to settle 
with third parties within policy limits. 
There is no analogy. In the liability insurance case 
the insured suffers a loss as a result of the insurance 
company's refusal .fo settle, namely, a verdict in excess 
of policy limits. In this case, Miss Lyon obtains a benefit 
by reason of the insurance company's refusal to settle. 
She gets all, rather than part, of her claim. 
If she is entitled to legal expense's occasioned by 
reason of Hartford's refusal to pay what she claims is 
due under her policy, then every litigant suing on a con-
tract is entitled to his expenses if the other party refuses 
to settle. In other words, attorneys' fees becomes re-
coverable in all contract cases despite the absence of a 
provision or statute to that effect. The law of Utah is 
otherwise. Blake v. Blake, 17 Utah 2d 369, 412 P.2d 454 
(1966). 
10 
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CONCLUSION 
The claims against Hartford in this case are based 
upon an insurance policy. The terms of that policy are 
clear and unambiguous and under that policy Hartford 
has no liability in this case. 
The public policy of the State of Utah, evidenced by 
legislation requiring uninsured motorist coverage un-
less expressly rejected, has been fully served by Miss 
Lyon having been permitted to recover all that she would 
have recovered had the uninsured motorist had the basic 
limits required by Utah law. The judgment against 
Hartford should be reversed and Hartford held not 
liable in any amount. 
But in any event, if the court concludes that some 
amount is payable, under no reasonable view of this case 
can that amount exceed $10,000 less than the $2,000 paid 
under the medical payments coverage. 
Respectfully submitted, 
WORSLEY, SNOW & CHRIS-
TENSEN and HAROLD G. 
CHRISTENSEN 
7th Floor, Continental 
Bank Bldg. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
.Attorneys for Defendant and 
.Appellant 
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